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Abstract 
 
 
A decision maker is contemplating an action whose outcome is state dependent. She has a ‘prior’ 
over the states of the world and before choosing an action, she can consult an ‘expert’. We model 
the communication game between the decision maker and the expert as a ‘cheaptalk’ game. 
Expert quality however is heterogenous. Some can obtain informative signals while the others 
can not. Since an expert known to be informed earns a rent in the future, uninformed experts 
would like to disguise as informed. We show that such concern for future reputation imposes 
severe constraints on the possibility of beneficial communication. Decision makers who can 
benefit from such communication are characterized in terms of the relevant parameters which 
include the prior of the decision makers and the cost of mistaken decisions. Next we address the 
issue of delegation. The questions that we ask are which decision makers choose to delegate, and 
to whom they delegate. In situations involving public goods, we characterize the decision makers 
who will strictly prefer to delegate, and show that when delegation occurs, the delegate is 
necessarily more extreme than the original decision maker in terms of her prior. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Those who are very sure need not care for a second opinion. Their posteriors after getting an 
expert opinion may not induce them to act any diﬀerently than without the advice. Only those 
with more moderate priors can at all gain from an expert’s advice. Their posteriors after the 
advice prompt them to act diﬀerently and might increase their expected payoﬀ. For these 
moderates however the problem changes if the population of experts contain some quacks as 
well. If the expert happens to be a quack, the advice itself will be influenced by the opinion-
seeker’s predisposition or prior. The latter has to take this into account. This will leave a smaller 
group of agents who would act any diﬀerently with the advice than without. But then, because 
the expert may play up to her client’s predisposition, these remaining agents face an interesting 
option. Does it pay Jack to send Jill, who has a diﬀerent prior, to talk to the expert?  
 
Our model sets up an agent contemplating actions with state-contingent payoﬀs. She has a prior 
belief about the probability of the states and can hire an expert to update her priors before the 
action. Experts come from a population of informed as well as uninformed ones and are 
concerned about their reputation. Two related questions are posed: (1) Can we characterize the 
agents who would at all gain from an expert’s advice? and (2) If the outcomes are public goods, 
when, if at all, is it better for an agent to assign the task of playing with experts to another agent? 
We first formalize an ‘informative’ equilibrium for the game between an agent and an expert. 
Informally, it is an equilibrium where a ‘good’ expert reports her information truthfully, and the 
decision maker uses it profitably. Profitable use means being able to improve payoﬀs by acting 
diﬀerently with the expert’s input. The analysis then partitions the set of all agents into those 
who can sustain an informative equilibrium and those who can not. We also explore the eﬀect on 
this partitioning of the cost of choosing a wrong action, the quality of experts’ signals and the 
proportion of informed experts in the population. 
 
The issue of delegation is then examined assuming that the outcomes are public goods. 
Arranging agents who can gain from advice in the order of their priors, we show that all but 
those with the highest and the lowest priors can gain by delegating to another person in the set. 
Those at one or the other extreme of the set will be the best choice for delegation by others.  
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The context in which the first question is asked is fairly general: it involves contingent action 
with noisy information inputs. The context for the second question is more restricted: the 
outcomes are public goods for the set of all decision makers. Examples of the first context are 
straightforward. Consider a group of farmers who have varied prior expectations that they have 
underground water in their property. But it can not be known for sure without actually drilling a 
well, which thus has a contingent payoﬀ. They can consult a hydrologist at some cost. They 
know, firstly, that hydrological advice is based on noisy signals, and secondly not all 
hydrologists are qualified. We try to answer our first question by analyzing the information game 
between an arbitrary farmer and an expert whose type is not known. In this game farmers who 
are too sure either way would not be able to sustain an informative equilibrium. We can 
characterize the set of farmers who can use expert advice in terms of the cost of unwarranted 
drilling and other relevant parameters. This part of the analysis develops a structure which is then 
used for the second question, where the outcomes are public goods. To continue with the same 
example, suppose the farmers are planning a community well in their village. Everyone would 
equally benefit from the well if drilling is successful. They also equally share the cost. The priors 
about the existence of groundwater however are diﬀerent for diﬀerent farmers. Is it immaterial 
who consults the hydrologist? If not, who is the best person to do so? Similar decision problems 
arise in corporate boards, local governments and community levels, wherever the outcome of the 
actions are public goods for the members of the decision making group.  
 
In early literature on information games, eg. Sobel [16], Bénabou and Laroque [2], ‘good’ 
experts were assumed to always tell the truth. By contrast, if experts behave strategically so that 
signals are endogenous, there can be an adverse eﬀect. The problem was first raised by 
Holmstrom and Ricarti Costa [8], and has been subsequently modelled in a number of contexts, 
eg. Scharfstein and Stein [14], Hölmstrom [7]. Our model also focuses on this adverse eﬀect, but 
the problem and the model structure are quite diﬀerent. Our paper is perhaps closest to Morris 
[11] who models an expert with a stake in the policy choice. In repeated games, she develops an 
instrumental concern for reputation to be able to influence policy in future. The concern of that 
paper is about the resulting eﬀect on policy choice, which is the focus of our paper too. Morris, 
however, does not discuss the possibility of delegation.  
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Outcomes for a model with our preoccupations are expected to be influenced by two basic 
elements of the structure. The first is the payoﬀ function for experts through which we introduce 
their concern for reputation. In our model an expert’s payoﬀ is a function of the probability of 
being rehired or revisited. Concern for reputation arises directly from this payoﬀ. Uninformed 
experts would not like to be exposed nor would an informed expert want to be mistaken for an 
uninformed one. An informative equilibrium in this situation, when it exists, will have specific 
features that we utilize for the possibility of delegation. The second aspect of the structure is that 
while one of the actions would reveal the true state through observed ex-post payoﬀs, the other 
does not give information about the states. Natural context for the model is when the set of 
actions contain the status quo. The assumption that the status quo is uninformative can create 
significant eﬀects on policy choice, see for example Fernandez and Rodrik [5]. In our model it 
creates a strategic tendency for the uninformed expert to recommend the status quo. The 
informative equilibrium is a configuration that holds this tendency of the uninformed expert in 
check. If both actions could subsequently reveal the state, no informative equilibrium would 
exist in our model structure.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the overall model. To develop 
the intuition of the model, in Section 3 we first present a simpler model where the expert’s type 
is known. There we characterize the set of agents who can benefit from the expert’s advice. 
Section 4 then develops the main model with experts of both types. We show (Propositions 1 and 
2) that an informative equilibrium, if it exists, is unique. In the presence of uninformed experts 
the possibility of useful information flow declines, and we characterize the set of decision 
makers who can benefit from an expert in this situation (Proposition 3). Section 5 analyzes the 
possibility of delegation. We show that (1) the set of decision makers who may delegate is 
identical to the set of decision makers who benefit from experts’ advice; and (2) agents with only 
two possible priors would ever be entrusted with delegation (Proposition 4). We further establish 
an interesting result arising from the possibility of delegation that the probability of reform may 
sometimes increase when the ex-ante cost of reform increases (Proposition 5). In section 6 we 
outline a slightly diﬀerent model where agents are diﬀerentiated by utility functions and not 
priors. We show that the diﬀerence in the signals received by diﬀerent agents can create the 
possibility of delegation in that structure too. Finally Section 7 discusses the model’s robustness 
properties.  
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2. Environment 
 
A decision maker has state-contingent payoﬀs from two alternative actions a0 and a1. There are 
two states 0 and 1. With action a1, the payoﬀ to the decision maker is 1 if the state is 1, while 
this payoﬀ is - λ, λ>0, if the true state is 0. With action a0 in place however, the payoﬀ to the 
decision maker is identical across the states. Without loss of generality, we normalize this payoﬀ 
to 0. In contexts involving policy choice, action a0 can be thought of as the status-quo which can 
be broken by the policy a1. We denote by p the prior assessment of the decision maker that the 
state of the world is 1. 
  
Before choosing an action, the decision maker can consult an expert. The task of the expert is to 
gather information about the state and convey it to the decision maker. There are two types of 
experts in the population: type I and II. Type I experts receives a noisy signal s ∈  {s0,s1}. The 
probability of getting the signal si when the state is i is given by 1 ≥ q>1/2. These signals are thus 
informative of the states. Type II experts do not receive any informative signals. One way to 
justify this assumption is to postulate a cost of collecting information that diﬀers across the 
expert types. The dichotomy of uninformed and informed experts can then be interpreted as the 
latter having a relatively small cost of obtaining signals while the former has a prohibitively high 
cost. In section 7.4 we indicate how we can obtain a lower bound on the range of costs for which 
type II experts will remain uninformed in any equilibrium. From now on we will refer to type I 
experts as informed and others as uninformed. We use pE to denote the prior of an expert that the 
state is 1. Finally let r be the proportion of informed experts in the population, 0 < r< 1.  
 
The interaction between the expert and the decision maker is modelled as a cheap talk game in 
which the expert sends a message m from a finite set of messages M. The decision maker does 
not observe whether the expert is informed, i.e, received a signal or not. Upon receiving a 
message, the decision maker updates her prior p and uses the posterior assessment to choose an 
action a ∈  {a0,a1}. Payoﬀs are then realized. For the decision maker, the payoﬀ depends on her 
action choices and the realized state as specified earlier. The payoﬀ to the expert consists of two 
components. The first is a fixed wage (which is normalized to 0) while the second represents the 
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reputational rent she earns in future11. We capture this reputational rent by postulating the 
existence of a second period where the decision maker can decide to rehire this expert. If hired, 
the expert earns V1 while her payoﬀ is V2 otherwise. Let V = V1 V2 > 0 which we interpret as the 
reputational rent. The decision regarding the next period hiring can not be contracted upon in the 
beginning of period 1 and will be decided at the end of the first period. We assume that this 
decision is based on the decision maker’s posterior belief about the expert’s type. Let r)  denote 
the belief of the decision maker that expert she faces is informed22 . Given r) , the decision maker 
then decides whether to keep the expert or fire her. We postulate a simple decision rule: if r) > r, 
the expert is kept with probability 1 while r) <r the expert is fired with probability 1. When r) = r, 
however, the decision maker keeps the expert with probability π ∈  [0,1]. We assume that experts 
care only about being rehired and thus follow the objective of maximizing the probability of re-
employment33 .  
 
The presence of a hiring decision in the second period is only for analytical convenience. 
Alternatively, we could posit that r)  becomes common knowledge at the end of period 1 and the 
expert’s second period market wage depends positively on r) . Qualitatively similar results can be 
obtained in this alternative formulation as long as long term contracts on experts’ future market 
wages are precluded.  
                                                 
1 We can easily allow state contingent contracts for the current period’s remuneration. See section 7.3. 
2 This updating depends both on the message m sent by the expert and the subsequent events. With action a1, the 
state of the world will be inferred accurately while the decision maker will use this information in updating her 
beliefs.  However no such knowledge is available if the choice was a0 and the updating rule in this case can only 
condition on the original message sent by the expert. 
3 In section 7.2 we indicate how our results generalize if experts’ payoﬀs also depend on the choice of the actions. 
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3. Communication When the Expert’s Type is Known  
 
The central question of the model is how a decision maker can use experts to provide meaningful 
inputs into her decision making. In common sense terms, expert’s services can be said to 
contribute to the decision making process if the decision maker chooses the action a1 when the 
expert sees the signal s1 and chooses a0 otherwise. To obtain some intuition for the incomplete 
information game where the decision maker is unsure of the expert’s type, it is instructive to first 
analyze a scenario where the expert’s type is known. Since there is no room for beneficial 
communication when the expert is uninformed, assume that the decision maker knows she faces 
an informed expert. Assume further that the expert has reported her signals truthfully. How and 
when can a decision maker with an arbitrary p use such information?  
 
If p% p is the posterior of the decision maker that the state is 1, then she chooses a1 if and only if 
p%  - (1 p% )λ ≥ 0, or equivalently if p%  ≥ λ/(1 + λ). Hence the expert’s information is useful if the 
posterior of the decision maker is at least λ/(1 + λ) when the signal received is s1, and it does not 
exceed λ/(1 + λ) when the signal received is s0.  
 
Denote by Δ 1(p), i = 0, 1, the probability that the decision maker assigns to the event that the 
expert receives the signal si, i = 0, 1. Clearly:  
 
Δ 1(p) = pq + (1  I)(1  q) and  Δ 0(p) = p(1  q) + (1  p)q 
 
Thus when the decision maker knows that the realized signal is si, her posteriors that the state is 
1 are given respectively by:  
 
p 1(p) = 1( )
pq
pΔ  and  p
0(p) = 0
(1 )
( )
p q
p
−
Δ  
 7
For the expert’s information to be useful, we must have:  
 
p 1(p) ≥λ/(1 + λ) ≥p 0(p). 
Let p*  and p* satisfy: 
  
p 1(p*) = λ/(1 + λ) = p 0(p*) 
 
It is easy to check that p* and p* exist and are unique. Further, p* > p*.  
 
We conclude that an expert’s service will be useful to a decision maker with prior p if and only if 
p ∈  P ≡ (p, p).  
 
If EU (p) is the decision maker’s payoff when she does not consult the expert, then EU (p) = 0 if 
p<λ/(1 + λ)  
 
EU (p) = p λ(1  p) if p>λ/(1 + λ) 
 
Let EI (p) denote the expected payo of a decision maker with prior p  P if she consults an 
expert. Clearly,  
 
EI (p) = qp -  λ(1 -  p)(1 -  q). 
 
From the earlier discussion, it follows that EI (p) > EU (p) if and only if p  P.  
 
Remark 1 p decreases and p increases in q and as q  1, p0 and  → p → 1. Thus as the signal 
quality of the expert becomes perfect (q → 1), all decision makers will benefit from using the 
expert’s advice.  
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4. Communication When Types are Unknown  
 
In this section, we characterize the set of BayesianNash equilibria of the game between an expert 
and a decision maker. It is well known that cheaptalk games typically have multiple equilibria. 
The same is true here as well. We are however interested in an equilibrium outcome where the 
decision maker is strictly better o using the services of an expert. In such an equilibrium, the 
messages must convey information to the decision maker regarding the state of the world and 
thus her choice of action should depend (in a non trivial way) on the message she receives. Such 
an equilibrium, if it exists, will be referred to as an informative equilibrium.  
 
To gain some insights about the structure of an informative equilibrium, we first observe that in 
any such equilibrium, the set of messages that are sent by the uninformed expert must coincide 
with the set of messages that are sent by the informed ones. Second, given any signal realization, 
since the informed expert will only randomize between two distinct messages if each of them 
yields the same expected payo, without any loss of generality, we can restrict our attention to 
equilibria where only two messages are sent. Call them m1 and m0. Given mi, let hi be the 
probability that action a1 is chosen. Since the decision maker is strictly better o using the 
expert’s service, it must be that h1 = h0. Further if h1 ≥ h0, then either h1 = 1 or h0 = 0.  
 
Thus it follows that the informed expert must send in the message m1 when the signal is s1 and 
the message m0 otherwise. Finally, the uninformed expert needs to randomize over the two 
messages such that the posterior of the decision maker with either of the messages is exactly r. 
Formally, we record the properties of an informative equilibrium in Proposition 1.  
 
Proposition 1 In any informative equilibrium, there exists message m1 and m0 such that:  
 
(a)  An informed expert sends message mi if and only if her signal is si.  
(b)  An uninformed expert sends the message m0 with probability 0(p) = p(1 -  q) + q(1 -  p) 
and sends m1 with the remaining probability.  
(c)  With the message mi, the decision maker must choose ai with probability 1.  
(d)  With message m0 and action choice a0, the expert is rehired with probability π = pE . 
With message m1 and action choice a1, the expert is rehired with probability 1 (resp. 
probability 0) if the state of the world turns out to be 1 (resp. state 0)4 .  
 9
Proof: See Appendix. 
  
Given the strategies of the experts, on getting the messages mi the posteriors of the decision 
maker that the state is 1 are: 
  
p˜=  p[rq + (1 -  r)1]  and p˜= p[r(1 − q) + (1 − r)0] , 10 
 
where i are as defined in the previous section. It follows from Proposition  
  
1(c) that in an informative equilibrium p˜> λ/(11 + λ) >p˜. Let p0 and p satisfy  
 
p˜1(p) = λ/(1 + λ) = p˜0(p) 
 
Observation 1 For 1 > q > 0, p, p exist and are unique. Further p > λ/(1 + λ) > p.  
Define P as P ≡ (p,p)  
 
Proposition 2 The game between a decision maker with prior p and an the expert admits of an 
informative equilibrium if and only if p  P.  
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
Remark 2 For the decision makers on the boundary of P, i.e, p {p,p}, the strategies given in 
Proposition 1 also constitute an equilibrium of the communication game. However there are also 
other equilibria. It is possible to show that for any h  [0,1], there is an equilibrium outcome, 
where (i) if the decision maker is p, she chooses a0 with probability 1 with message m0 but 
chooses a1 with probability h with message m1; while (ii) if the decision maker is p, she chooses 
a1 with probability 1 with message m1 but chooses a0 with probability (1 − h) with message m0. 
These equilibria however are not informative in that the decision makers p (or p) are not strictly 
better o using an expert’s advice. We will see in the next section 
  
In any such informative equilibrium, the expert’s prior only determines the rehiring decision 
probabilities of the expert and has no effect on the equilibrium choice of actions.  
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that while these decision makers do not themselves benefit from communication, they play a 
very important role when we consider the possibility of delegation.  
 
To calculate the expected payout to the decision maker in an informative equilibrium, break it up 
into two components. The first component is what she receives if she was facing an informed 
expert and the second component is her payout when the expert is uninformed. Since along an 
equilibrium, the informed expert reports her signal ‘truthfully’, the payout to the decision maker 
when she faces the informed expert is EI (p).  
 
With the uninformed expert, however, action a1 will be chosen with probability 1(p) and action 
a0 with the remaining probability. Thus the expected payout of the decision maker when she 
faces the uninformed expert is 1(p)EU (p).  
 
Since the population has r proportion of informed experts, the expected payout to a decision 
maker p P in any informative equilibrium is given by: 
  
E(p) ≡ rEI (p) + (1 − r)1(p)EU (p) (1 
 
It is obvious that E(p) >EU (p) whenever p  P.  
 
What is the relationship of P to P 5 .  
 
Proposition 3 P  P.  
 
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward. Since q>1/2, we have q>pq+ (1 − p)(1 − q) 
and thus the presence of an uninformed expert has the effect of reducing the quality q of the 
signal received by expert 1. The proposition thus is an immediate consequence of Remark 1.  
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5. Delegation  
 
In this section we assume that the outcomes of choosing ai,i= 0,1 are both public goods. Because 
in the informative equilibrium of the information game, agents with different priors choose a0 
and a1 with different probabilities, it is natural to ask whether a decision maker could increase 
her ex ante payout by delegating the responsibility of consulting an expert and the choice of 
action to some other decision maker. Any such delegate is assumed to be identical to the original 
decision maker in every respect except possibly for her initial prior on the states of the world. If 
an agent p delegates to another agent and the delegate chooses a1, the payout to both p and the 
delegate are 1 in state 1, and −λ in state 0; and if the delegate chooses a0, both have a payout of 
0. Further, once the delegate is employed, the original decision maker has no further control the 
choice of actions as well as the rehiring decision will be made by the delegate in place.  
 
5P , recall, is the set of priors that would have used the service of an expert in the absence of any 
incomplete information.  
 
As we have already discussed, an example of contexts where such delegation is meaningful is the 
voting problem. The election issue is if the government should introduce a reform package or 
continue with the status quo. The success of the reform depends on the state of the world. 
Assume that the payout from reform, both successful and failed, and status quo are uniform 
across agents, but their priors are different. The elected leader will use her oce of experts and 
finally decide between reform or status quo. If the median voter wins, the probability of her 
choosing the two policies would depend on the informative equilibrium in the game between her 
and the expert(s). The probabilities could be different if another agent was elected. Can the ex 
ante payout of the median voter be higher if she votes some one other than herself as the leader? 
In decision making bodies smaller than an electorate such problems perhaps appear more often. 
Consider a committee of the defence ministry planning a raid. An unsuccessful raid is costly. 
Members have equal payouts in success, failure and status quo, but the parameters crucial to the 
success are not fully known. Members have different priors. One who will be put up in charge 
has to take the final decision using spying agencies’ information. Supposing some members can 
sustain an informative equilibrium playing against information sources, they will generally 
realize a different probability mix of raiding and not raiding after the information input. Some 
members can increase their ex ante payout by delegating to another member.  
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To analyze the outcome of the delegation game formally, we will assume that whenever the 
delegate’s prior is in P, an informative equilibrium obtains, and thus the delegate’s payout 
corresponds to E(p) as given in equation (1). Further if the delegate’s prior is either por p, we 
select the equilibrium (see discussion in Remark 2) that gives the highest payo to the original 
decision maker.  
 
The questions that we ask now are (i) which decision makers choose to delegate, and (ii) who are 
the chosen delegates?  
 
If H is the set of decision makers that delegate and D the set of those delegated upon, the 
following proposition provides a simple answer to these two questions.  
 
Proposition 4 
  
(a)  H= P  
(b)  D= {p,p}.  
(c)  For p P, if p<λ/(1 + λ) then p delegates to p, and if p>λ/(1 + λ), then p delegates to p.  
 
Proof: See Appendix.  
 
Proposition 4 shows that the entire set P will find it optimal to use a delegate and it is the end 
points of P that act as delegates. The proposition also shows that if an agent is predisposed to 
action a1 ie p > λ/(1 + λ), then she would gain by electing an agent who is more predisposed to 
a1 than herself. Likewise if she is predisposed towards a0, then she should elect one who is more 
oriented to a0. The intuition for this result is as follows. Consider a decision maker with prior 
greater than λ/(1 + λ). If she could not consult an expert, her optimal action is a1. Therefore her 
optimal action is still a1 when she is faced with an uninformed expert. Now recall that in 
equilibrium, the uninformed expert sends the message m1 with probability 1 - p(1 - q)+q(1 - p) 
when she faces the decision maker p. Higher values of pleads to a higher probability that the 
message m1 is sent by the uninformed expert. Since the original decision maker will prefer that 
a1 be chosen when the expert she faces is uninformed, she will like to increase the probability 
that message m1 is sent by the uninformed expert. The way she can do it is to put in a delegate 
who has a higher initial prior than her own. Note however that it does not help to elect arbitrarily 
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extreme candidates since by Proposition 2, an informative equilibrium can not be sustained with 
a delegate with prior above p. Thus the optimal choice for a decision maker with p>λ/(1 + λ), p 
P, is to choose the delegate p. An analogous intuitive argument explains why a decision maker 
who is initially predisposed to action a0 should choose the delegate p. 
  
It may be of interest to explore the eect of λand r6 on the incentives of a decision maker for 
delegation and its eect on the action choices.  
 
First consider the effect of increasing r, the proportion of informed experts in the population. It is 
easy to check that p decreases in r while p increases in r. Thus when r increases, more decision 
makers will find it profitable to consult an expert. How does this affect the probability of action 
a1 being chosen when the true state is 1? From Proposition 1, we know that when p  P, this 
probability is rq+ (1 − r)1(p). Since q > 1(p), it follows that with increased r, it is more likely 
that the right action a1 will be chosen when the state is 1. With delegation possibilities however, 
this result may indeed reverse for a range of decision makers. To see how this could happen, 
observe from Proposition 4 that if p H and p<λ/(1 + λ), then pwill delegate to p. Thus for all 
such priors, the probability that action a1 is chosen in state 1 is given by rq+ (1 − r)1(p). 
Keeping pfixed, this probability will increase if r increases. However pis not going to stay fixed. 
An increase in rdecreases pand thus 1(p) will go down. It is thus entirely possible (for small 
values of r) that an increase in the proportion of informed experts leads to an eventual decrease 
in the probability that action.6 
 
Comparative statics of changing q and r are similar. a1 is chosen when the true state is 1.  
 
About the eect of λ, the exante cost of action a1, it is easy to see that both p and p increase with 
λ. Thus with an increase in λ, some decision makers (p close to p) will no longer be able to 
invoke an informative equilibrium and consequently will be content with choosing action a0. On 
the other hand, there will also be a new group of decision makers (p higher than p but close to it) 
who will now be able to profitably use the expert’s recommendation. Since these decision 
makers were previously choosing action a1 with probability 1, a higher cost of λ will reduce their 
probability of taking action a1. For the rest of the decision makers (who continue to use the 
expert’s service), the probability of action a1 in equilibrium is unaltered. Thus in the absence of 
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delegation, an increased cost of action a1 can not lead to an increased probability that action a1 is 
chosen.  
 
This intuitive result however does not necessarily hold when we allow for delegation 
possibilities. To see why this happens, given λ, let g(p,λ) denote the probability that the action a1 
is chosen when the state is 1 and the decision maker is p  P. From Proposition 4, we know 
that if p < λ/(1 + λ), p will use the delegate p and thus g(p,λ) = rq+ (1 − r)1(p) and for p > λ/(1 + 
λ), g(p,λ)= rq + (1 − r)1(p). Since both p and p increase with λ it follows that there will be a 
range of priors in P for which the probability of action a1 can indeed go up when the cost of 
that action goes up.  
 
We summarize the above discussion in the following Proposition.  
 
Proposition 5 There exists a range of priors in P for which the probability of action a1 can 
decrease with an increase in r while increasing with increased λ.  
 
The proof follows immediately from the earlier discussion and therefore omitted.  
 
 
6. Identical Priors  
 
We have assumed that the ex ante distribution of priors is common knowledge. Although aware 
that it goes against what Aumann termed the Harsanyi doctrine, we feel that this assumption 
provides a natural environment for the problems we wanted to mdel. Banerjee and Somanathan 
[1], Piketty [12] and Piketty and Spector [13] are recent papers which assume that agents are 
aware of their different priors.  
 
Difference in expected payouts reflects different utility functions and/or difference in priors. 
Although our context motivated us to use the difference of priors, it is easy to think of examples 
where the other assumption is more natural. In this section we argue that with some change in the 
structure, the possibility of delegation can be shown to exist in a model where agents have 
identical priors but vary in terms of utility functions.  
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Assume as before that there are two states 0 and 1 and let pnow denote the probability that the 
state is 1. Unlike before, we assume that p is the same across all agents. Assume also that the 
action a1 yields a payout of 1 in state 1 and a loss of λin state 0. With action a0, payout to a 
decision maker - is u where u is distributed over some interval [u1,u2]. Finally, we assume that a 
decision maker has access to a third action am which corresponds to a ‘moderate’ policy. This 
policy results in a gain of m, 1 > m > 0 if the true state is 1 while results in a loss of mλif the 
state is 0. We simplify by assuming that the type 1 expert has access to a signal that informs him 
of the exact state of the world, i.e, q= 1. The analysis of the cheap talk game with the expert and 
the decision maker yields a result analogous to that of Proposition 1. It is possible to show that in 
any informative equilibrium an expert of type 1 recommends action a1 (i.e sends the message 
m1) if and only if she receives the signal s1. The uninformed expert sends in m1 with probability 
p. The decision maker chooses a1 if the message is m1 and chooses a0 otherwise. To support 
such an equilibrium, however, it is necessary that the decision maker chooses a0 when she 
receives the message m0. Given q= 1, the posterior of the decision maker (when she receives 
m0) that the state is 1 is p(1 − r). Thus, for the decision maker to choose a0, it is necessary that  
u<m[p(1 − r)(1 + λ) − λ]. If this condition is not satisfied, the decision maker will not choose a0 
and this will destroy the possibility of achieving an informative equilibrium. Thus if the original 
decision maker is too averse to the status quo action a0, i.e, has a very low u, then this decision 
maker will be unable to use the services of an expert since the cheap talk game will not support 
an informative equilibrium. It is possible then that the decision maker will be better o 
delegating the decision making to a delegate with a high value of u who can achieve an 
informative equilibrium in the cheap talk game. To see this possibility, consider the following 
example. Let r =1/2, p =2/3, λ = −5, m =1/2 and let the original decision maker’s uequals −2. 
With q= 1, p(1 − r) = 1/3 and thus without delegation, this decision maker will choose am in the 
cheap talk game even when she receives the message m0. Consequently with such a decision 
maker, experts are of no use. The unique equilibrium outcome will have the decision maker 
choosing action am resulting in a pay out of −3/2.  
 
With the possibility of delegation however things can be improved. Consider a decision maker 
with -u>−3/2. With such a decision usatisfying 0 >-maker, there exists the possibility of 
obtaining the informative equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, action a1 will be chosen when 
message m1 is sent and action a0 chosen otherwise. The expected payoﬀ to the original decision 
uu maker from such an equilibrium is 1/2[p+(1−p)¯+p2 +(1−p)¯−p(1−p)λ]= −2/3 >−3/2.  
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7.  Discussion  
 
The possibility of delegation in this paper arises from the fact that in the equilibrium of the 
information game, agents with diﬀerent priors will realize diﬀerent probabilities of the action 
mix. It is therefore crucial that the information game admits of informative equilibria for a non-
empty subset of decision makers. Hence it is important to ask which elements of the model 
structure are crucial for the existence of such equilibria. One such element is the informative 
potential of the actions. In our model the choice of the statusquo does not give rise to information 
about the true state of the world and hence does not help revise the posterior about the expert’s 
type. a0 thus is not just another action but is qualitatively different from a1. This assumption is a 
natural choice for the contexts we have discussed. But we should point out that difference in the 
informative potential of policies creates significant eﬀects in models of policy choice (see for 
example Fernandez and Rodrik[4]) and it is a crucial assumption for our model. Suppose both 
action choices eventually led to information about the soundness of the expert’s advice. In such a 
case, it is possible to show that the information game does not admit of an informative 
equilibrium for any p. The information game in that case would produce equilibria where no 
decision maker can elicit information and each is best oﬀ acting by herself.  
 
Other structural elements of the model are not crucial for our results. Below we discuss 
robustness properties in relation to the other elements.  
 
7.1  Costly Signalling  
We have allowed only costless communication strategies in the communication game between 
the expert and the decision maker. If experts could send costly signals (like ‘burning money’), 
could not an informed expert distinguish herself from uninformed ones? To analyze that 
possibility, assume that an informed expert, after receiving the signal s1, decides to ‘burn’ 
Cwhere C satisfies pE V <C<V. Seeing this costly signal, the decision maker should believe that 
she faces an informed expert, and thus may be willing to choose action a1. This however can not 
be an equilibrium of the signalling game. Along the equilibrium path if the action choice a1 
proves to be a mistake, i.e, the state of the world was actually zero, the decision maker will 
ascribe this to the imperfectness of the signal received by the expert. The posterior that she faces 
an informed expert will continue to remain at 1 and the expert will be rehired with probability 1. 
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But in that case the uninformed expert would choose to ‘burn’ C as well. Since C<V, this will be 
a profitable deviation. Thus allowing for costly signalling will not change any of the results of 
the information game. We can show that if an informative equilibrium exists, then Proposition 1 
is true with or without the use of costly signals. The uninformed expert will still randomize the 
messages with probabilities undistinguishable from an informed expert’s. In equilibrium the only 
diﬀerence will be in the probability of rehiring. The equilibrium probability of actions and the 
expected payoﬀ to a decision maker of prior p will continue to be characterized by Proposition 2. 
 
7.2  Experts’ Payouts  
We assumed that an expert cares only about getting rehired. She has no concern for the actual 
choice of action. Would the results change if she also had a stake in the choice? Assume that an 
expert’s payout function is πV + w[pE (1 + λ) − λ], where π is the probability of rehire and w is a 
positive constant. Assume for simplicity that q = 1. Now observe that since w > 0, an informed 
expert does not have any incentive to deviate from the strategy of sending message mi when the 
signal is si. Further if an informative equilibrium exists, then it must be that the uninformed 
expert sends message mi according to the probabilities given in Proposition 1. So the issue is 
whether an informative equilibrium will obtain or not. The payoﬀ to the uninformed expert by 
sending message m1 is pE V + w[pE (1 + λ) − λ] while she gets πV if she sends m0 where π is 
the probability of rehire given the message m0. It follows that if w is not too large, there would 
exist a π, 0 < π < 1 such that pE V + w[pE (1 + λ) − λ]= πV. Thus for w > 0 but not too 
large, Proposition 1, parts (a)(c) will continue to hold.7 For w large however there may not exist 
π that will make the uninformed expert indierent between sending the two messages. In such 
cases an informative equilibrium will fail to exist.  
 
7.3  State Contingent Contracts  
We assumed that experts are paid a fixed amount, independent of the action choice and the 
outcome. We now investigate how our results may be aected if it were possible to write 
contracts with state contingent payments. We will however maintain the assumption that a 
decision maker can not write a contract that relates to the future hiring decision of an expert. In 
this 10 setting then, a contract is a 3tuple (w0,w1,w1). The expert is paid w0 i if action a0 is 
chosen and w1 in state i if action a1 is chosen. Assuming limited liability, these payments are 
nonnegative. Assume that the decision maker’s prior is such that she prefers to choose action a0 
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when facing an uninformed expert, while she would choose action a1 if facing an informed 
expert with the signal s1. Can the decision maker design a contract with the following features (i) 
the informed expert will send messages that reveal the true signal; (ii) the uninformed expert 
sends a message that separates her from the informed type? The answer is yes. But to achieve 
such a 7 
 
What will change however is the probability of rehiring of the experts.  
10 
separation, the contract (w0, w1, w1 ) must satisfy  
10 0  
w0 ≥ V + pE (w1 − w1) + w (2)8 
1  
This separation however is costly for the decision maker. To calculate the expected cost of the 
decision maker, observe that with probability 1, the uninformed expert has to be paid w0 = V 
while if the expert is informed, the action a0 will be chosen with probability (1 − p)9 when w0 
needs to be paid to the informed expert. Thus the expected cost to the decision maker is [r(1 −p) 
+ (1 −r)]w0. Given that w1 ≥ 0, the minimum value of w0 for which equation (2) can be satisfied 
is V . Thus the costs to the decision maker of using this state contingent contract is at least [r(1 − 
p) + (1 − r)]V . What is the benefit to the decision maker of using such a scheme? Since without 
the state contingent contract, a1 will be chosen when facing the uninformed expert with 
probability p (see Proposition 1), net gain of using the state contingent contract is (1 − r)p(λ − 
p(1 + λ). Thus using the contingent contract will be dominated whenever [r(1 − p) + (1 − r)]V > 
(1 − r)p(λ − p(1 + λ)10 . Therefore in all such instances, the decision maker will be better oﬀ 
using a non contingent wage contract as analyzed in the paper and our results will hold. 
 
7.4  Costs of Information  
In this section we briefly describe how our results generalize if we allow for Type II experts to 
acquire information but at a cost c. Assume as before that experts are paid a fixed wage in the 
first period and face a prospect of getting V in the next period. To simplify exposition, assume 
further that q = 1. Assume now that an informative equilibrium exists where both types of 
experts gather information and report their signals truthfully. The decision maker’s posterior 
after any message/ action must assign probability r that the expert is of type I. Let α be the 
probability that the expert is hired after the action a0 and let βi, i = 0, 1 be the probability of 
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rehire given action a1 and the realized state i. Now if the expert of type II does not gather any 
information, she can assure herself a payo of max{αV, pE β1V + (1 − pE )β0V }. Thus 
spending c to gather information will be incentive compatible if and only if  
 
pE β1V + (1 − pE )αV − c ≥ max{αV, pE β1V + (1 − pE )β0V } (3) 
 
Note that if equation (3) holds for some values of (α, β1, β0), then (3) also holds when β0 = 0, β1 
= 1 and α = pE . Using (3), we then conclude that an  
8 Note that the uninformed expert will forgo all reputational rent once she separates herself from 
the informed types and that explains why there is no term involving V on the left hand side of the 
equation.  
9 Recall that we are assuming q = 1  
10 Note that this inequality hold for any values of V and λ as long as r is close to 1.  
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informative equilibrium where type II experts gather information will exist if and only if pE (1 − 
pE )V >c. Since pE (1 − pE ) is maximized at pE = 1/2, we thus conclude that if c, the cost of 
obtaining information is greater than V/4, the expert of type II will never be informed in any 
equilibrium, and our analysis applies.  
 
 
8. Appendix  
 
Proof of Proposition 1 Without loss of generality, we restrict our attention to two message 
{m0,m1} (see the discussion preceding Proposition 1). Given that the equilibrium is informative, 
it must be that both messages are sent with positive probabilities along an equilibrium path. Let 
hi be the probability that action a1 is chosen given the message mi,i= 0,1. Let h1 ≥ h0. Since the 
equilibrium strictly benefits the decision maker, it must be that h1 >h0.  
 
We first argue that the uninformed expert’s strategy must assign positive probabilities to both 
messages. Otherwise, after the message m which is sent only by the informed type, the decision 
maker must assign probability 1 to the event that she faces an informed expert. Such an expert 
will be rehired with probability 1 resulting in a payoﬀ of V to the informed expert. If the 
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informed expert has to send the other message m, then that message must also give her V. 
However the posterior of the decision maker that she faces an informed type must be strictly less 
than r on getting m and consequently the payoﬀ from m must be less than V. Thus the 
informed expert will not send both messages, contradicting the hypothesis that an informative 
equilibrium obtains. Hence the uninformed expert must send both messages with positive 
probability, i.e. she must be indiﬀerent between sending any of these messages. Further, if action 
a1 is chosen and the state is 1, the decision maker must assign r>r that she faces an informed 
expert and the expert will be rehired with probability 1 in such a case. On the other hand, if the 
state is 0, then the expert must be fired. Consequently, the uninformed expert’s payoﬀ if action 
a1 is chosen is pE V. Thus the payo to her from a0 must also be pE V.  
 
Since the q >1/2, the posterior of an informed expert after obtaining a signal must diﬀer from her 
original prior and consequently, the informed expert, for any signal realization will never 
randomize over the messages. Since h1 >h0, she will thus send m1 with probability 1 when she 
observes s1 while sending m0 when her signal is s0.  
 
Let r(m0,t) be the posterior of the decision maker that she faces an informed expert when she 
receives the message m0, given that an informed expert sends mi when she receives the signal si 
and the uninformed expert sends m0 with probability t. Clearly: 
  
r(m0,t) = r0(p)  
r0(p) + (1 − r)t  
 
Since after message m0, a0 is chosen with positive probability and the uninformed expert’s 
payo is pE V, the expert must be rehired with probability pE . But for this to happen, we must 
have r(m0,t)= r. This however is possible if and only t = 0(p).  
 
We now check that the strategy used by the decision maker is optimal. Given the strategies of the 
experts, if message mi is sent, the posterior of the decision maker that she faces an informed 
expert is exactly equal to r. Since choice of a0 does not lead to any further information, it is 
clearly optimal for the decision maker to choose π = pE . However after the choice of a1 
(following the message m1), the decision maker’s posterior will be greater than r if and only if 
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the state realized is 1. Hence the strategy of the decision maker that calls for rehiring the expert 
with probability 1 (resp. probability 0) after the choice of a1 and the realization of the state 1 
(resp. 0) is also optimal.  
 
Proof of Proposition 2. Assume first that an informative equilibrium exists. From Proposition 1 
(c), it follows that the decision maker must choose action ai, i = 1,0 with probability 1 when she 
receives the message 1 010 mi, i =1,0. Thus ˜≥ λ/(1 + λ) ≥ p˜. Since ˜and ˜are increasing 
pppfunctions of p, we then have p ≤ p ≤ p. We now show that when p  [p,p], the strategies 
given in Proposition 1 can indeed be supported as an equilibrium. Fix the decision maker’s 
strategy as in Proposition 1. Consider the uninformed expert. Given a message, if action a1 is 
chosen, then the expert will be rehired with probability 1 if the state is 1 while she will be fired 
otherwise. This gives an expected payo of pE V to the uninformed expert. On the other hand, 
choice of a0 results in the expert being retained with probability pE , yielding a payo of pE V. 
Thus the uninformed expert’s strategy of mixing the two messages is optimal.  
 
Consider an informed expert. Let pE (si) be her posterior that the state is i given signal si. Since 
q > 1/2, pE (s1) > pE > pE (s0). Thus the strategy of expert 1 of sending mi with probability 1 on 
observing si is optimal and this results in a payo strictly greater than pE V.  
 
To check for the optimality of the decision maker’s strategy, consider p  [p,p]. Clearly her 
posterior that the state is 1 is at least λ/(1 + λ) when she receives m1 while her posterior is no 
more than λ/(1 + λ) when she receives m0. These inequalities are strict whenever p is in the 
interior of P. Hence the action choice of the decision maker is optimal. The proof that the 
decision maker’s rehiring decision is optimal follows very similar lines to that of Proposition 1.  
Proof of Proposition 4 We first show that if p/, then pwill not  Pdelegate.  
 
Consider any p<p. If she were to delegate, the delegate’s prior must be at least p(Proposition 2). 
Now in the informative equilibrium that obtains with the decision maker with prior pand the 
expert, p1(p) = λ/(1 + λ) and thus the choice of action a1 will result in a zero payo to decision 
maker p. Hence for any p<psuch a choice will result in a negative payoﬀ. These decision makers 
are thus better oﬀ just choosing action a0.  
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Now consider any p>p. For her to profitably delegate, the delegate must have a prior no higher 
than p. In the informative equilibrium with p, the decision maker’s posterior after receiving the 
message m0 is exactly λ/(1 + λ) which makes her indifferent between action a0 and a1. However 
any decision maker with a higher prior will strictly prefer that the action a1 be chosen in such 
cases. Consequently, all such decision makers are better oﬀ not using either the delegates or the 
experts and choosing action a1.  
 
We now prove that if p P and p<λ/(1 + λ), then pwill delegate her decision to p. Since p<λ/(1 
+ λ), the decision maker’s payoﬀ can be increased if in the informative equilibrium, the 
uninformed expert is persuaded to send the message m0 with a higher probability. Since the 
uninformed expert sends the message m0 with probability 0(p)= p(1 − q) + q(1 − p) and 0(p) 
decreases with p( q>1/2), the decision maker’s payoﬀ will be maximized by choosing a delegate 
with the lowest prior that is consistent with supporting an informative equilibrium. Hence any p< 
λ/(1 + λ) will delegate her decision to p. An analogous argument establishes that if p>λ/(1 + λ) 
and p H, then pwill delegate to p.  
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